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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 09-3307 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
v. 
 
JAKE KELLY, 
                                  Appellant 
____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. No. 04-cr-00605-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jan E. Dubois 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 11, 2011 
____________ 
 
Before: SCIRICA, BARRY and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  January 20, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 A jury found Jake Kelly guilty of felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Kelly contends that the District Court erred (1) in denying his 
 2 
motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, (2) in its ruling on a motion in limine 
regarding his exculpatory statement, and (3) in instructing the jury. We will affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 A. Facts 
 Around 1:00 a.m. on May 1, 2004, Jake Kelly was sitting at the bar of Cafe 
Breezes, a neighborhood hangout on the first floor of a row house in West Philadelphia. 
After two undercover officers from the Philadelphia Police Department canvassed the bar 
for obvious criminal activity, approximately twenty law enforcement officers – from the 
Philadelphia Citywide Vice Enforcement Unit, Philadelphia Department of Licenses and 
Inspections, Pennsylvania State Police Liquor Control Enforcement, and the Narcotics 
Strike Force – entered Cafe Breezes to do an “open inspection.” (R. at 305.)   
Philadelphia Police Officer Donna Stewart was at Cafe Breezes during the 
inspection to provide backup for the undercover and plainclothes officers who were 
checking the identification of the bar‟s customers and ensuring that the bar complied with 
liquor regulations. Stewart also watched the customers to make sure that no one discarded 
any illegal items. Other than when she had a brief conversation with her partner, Stewart 
stood by the front door of the bar, behind Kelly, who sat at the corner of the “L”-shaped 
bar, on the short side of the “L.” Victor Jones, Kelly‟s friend, sat around the corner of the 
“L,” and the two undercover police officers sat next to Jones.  
Kelly caught Stewart‟s attention because he looked over his shoulder at her and 
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watched the other officers; he also “started to sweat” and “was fidgeting on his barstool.” 
(Id. at 349.) Stewart briefly left her position and told her partner that Kelly made her 
nervous. When she returned, she noticed that Kelly was sweating profusely and was 
“crunched over in his seat with his hands below the bar.” (Id. at 350.) After another police 
officer asked a different customer for his identification, Kelly announced that he had his 
identification and “reached quickly towards his back.” (Id. at 351.) Stewart put her hand 
on Kelly‟s shoulder, grabbed his wrist, and told him to stand up. As he stood, she saw a 
gun fall from his lap and down his left leg, and she yelled out “„Gun.‟” (Id. at 352.) Other 
officers put handcuffs on Kelly while Stewart picked up the gun from the floor. The gun 
was loaded with eleven rounds of ammunition, one of which was in the chamber, and the 
gun‟s serial number was obliterated. Kelly claims that as he was being arrested, he told 
the police that someone threw the gun at him.  
After the verdict, Kelly‟s newly appointed attorney was told by Kelly‟s girlfriend 
that Jones claimed that the gun at issue was not actually Kelly‟s gun. In contrast to the 
testimony of law enforcement officers at trial, Jones said that Cafe Breezes was crowded 
that night, and testified at a post-trial hearing that right before Kelly was arrested, 
someone in the crowd brushed into Jones and put a gun in his lap. Jones then pushed the 
gun off his lap and onto the floor. He was “pretty sure” that the gun Stewart picked up 
was the one that he pushed off his lap. (Id. at 686.) Jones did not reveal this series of 
events to anyone until he learned that Kelly had been convicted. Jones saw Kelly briefly 
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“once or twice” between Kelly‟s arrest and his conviction, but they never discussed this 
case, and Jones thought it had been resolved. (Id. at 706.) 
B. Procedural History 
The District Court denied Kelly‟s Rule 33 motion for a new trial, but granted his 
motion for a new trial based on Jones‟ testimony. The government appealed, and we 
reversed because Kelly had not shown that he exercised reasonable diligence in 
discovering Jones‟ testimony before trial. United States v. Kelly, 539 F.3d 172, 186 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (“Sitting on one's hands and waiting for a known eyewitness to come forward 
with potentially exculpatory information (or potentially inculpatory information from 
Jones's perspective) cannot be considered – by any definition – reasonable diligence.”). 
On remand, the District Court sentenced Kelly below the Guidelines range, to the 
mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months of imprisonment. Kelly timely appealed. 
II. ANALYSIS
1
 
 A. Motion for New Trial Under Rule 33 
 We review for abuse of discretion the District Court‟s denial of Kelly‟s Rule 33 
motion. With respect to that motion, the District Court “exercises its own judgment in 
assessing the Government‟s case” and does not read the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the government, but the Court may order a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 
“only if it believes that there is a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has occurred 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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– that is, that an innocent person has been convicted.” United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 
993, 1004-05 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Kelly contends that at trial there was “no reliable evidence that [he] actually 
„possessed‟ the firearm” because he did not “„control‟” it.  (Appellant‟s Br. at 13.) 
Stewart testified, however, that she saw Kelly hunched over with his hands in his lap and 
then saw a gun drop from his lap when she asked him to stand up. The jury clearly found 
Stewart to be credible, and the District Court reasonably concluded that any 
inconsistencies in Stewart‟s testimony did not “constitute the type of exceptional 
circumstances that would warrant a new trial in Kelly‟s case.” (R. at 25.) The Court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 33 motion, as the jury could have reasonably 
found from Stewart‟s testimony that Kelly “possessed” the gun. Stewart‟s testimony was 
not, moreover, clearly incredible or physically impossible, see United States v. Ferguson, 
246 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2001), and there is not a “serious danger” that Kelly is 
innocent.
2
    
 B. Motion in Limine 
 Kelly next argues that the District Court erred when it “preliminarily ruled” that he 
could not elicit evidence at trial of his statement as he was being arrested that someone 
threw the gun at him. (Appellant‟s Br. at 18.) Before trial, the government moved to 
                                                 
2
 Kelly maintains that we should take into account Jones‟ post-trial revelation 
regarding the origin of the gun, but the government argues that that would be improper 
given that we previously rejected Kelly‟s motion for a new trial based on that evidence. 
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exclude the statement as hearsay, and Kelly argued that the Court should nonetheless 
admit it as a present sense impression or excited utterance. At that point, however, there 
was no evidence in the record regarding the period of time that passed between the 
inciting incident – the gun falling from Kelly‟s lap and his apparently immediate arrest – 
and Kelly‟s statement. Because timing is critical to both exceptions that Kelly raised, the 
Court “defer[red] ruling” on the motion and said it would “see how the facts play[ed] 
out.” (R. at 87-88.) The Court “put[] the burden on” defense counsel to “address the issue 
as [he saw] fit.” (Id. at 89.) As Kelly admits, defense counsel did not raise this issue again 
during the trial, and the District Court denied the government‟s motion in limine as moot 
after the close of testimony. We review that decision for plain error. Walden v. Georgia-
Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 519-20 (3d Cir. 1997). 
Kelly maintains that the Court “abused its discretion[3] by constraining [him] from 
eliciting the statement,” but that argument misses the mark. (Appellant‟s Br. at 19.) The 
Court did not actually exclude Kelly‟s statement but rather waited to resolve the issue and 
denied it as moot only after the trial testimony had concluded and the issue had not been 
pressed. Kelly claims that his trial counsel “[o]bviously . . . felt constrained by the District 
Court‟s preliminary ruling.” (Id.) There is nothing to support that claim, and the Court did 
not commit plain error when it delayed ruling on the government‟s motion and then 
                                                                                                                                                             
We need not resolve this dispute because consideration of Jones‟ testimony would not 
alter our conclusion that the District Court did not abuse its discretion on this issue. 
3
 Under Walden, we review for plain error. We would, however, reach the same 
conclusion even if abuse of discretion was the appropriate standard. 
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denied the motion as moot after defense counsel failed to raise the issue at any time 
during the trial.  
 C. Jury Instructions 
 Kelly also argues that the District Court erred when it did not give the Third 
Circuit Model Jury Instruction that “„[m]ere proximity to the firearm or mere presence on 
the property where it is located or mere association with the person who does control the 
firearm or [the] property is insufficient to support a finding of possession.‟” (Appellant‟s 
Br. at 23 (quoting an optional portion of Third Circuit Model Jury Instruction No. 
6.18.922G-4, with the second alteration in the Model Instruction).) Kelly argues that 
“[g]iven the evidence presented at trial, this instruction was clearly appropriate.” 
(Appellant‟s Br. at 23.) We do not, however, review the instruction for whether it was 
appropriate. Rather, because Kelly did not raise this issue in the District Court, we review 
the instruction for plain error.  
In evaluating whether the District Court committed plain error, we determine 
“„whether, in light of the evidence presented at trial, the failure to instruct had a 
prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations, so that it produced a miscarriage of 
justice.‟” United States v. Haywood, 363 F.3d 200, 207 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting United 
States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1287 (3d Cir.1993)). There is no suggestion in the record 
that the fact that the Court did not give the “mere proximity” instruction had any impact, 
much less a prejudicial one, on the jury‟s deliberations. The Court gave the jury lengthy 
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instructions as to the definition of knowing possession of a firearm and that “[t]o possess 
means to have something within a person‟s control” and that “[t]o act knowingly, a 
defendant must be conscious and aware of his actions . . . he must realize what he is doing 
and not act because of ignorance, mistake or accident.” (R. at 535-36.) Assuming, as we 
do, that the jury followed these instructions, it could not have found Kelly guilty if he was 
only in “mere proximity” to the firearm. There is no miscarriage of justice here, and the 
District Court did not commit plain error when it did not give the jury the “mere 
proximity” instruction. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We will affirm the judgment of conviction. 
 
